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1.   Introduction 
In order to understand the recent global financial crisis and to see what impact it will have on 
the future of the world economy, it is important to study the changing world economic 
landscape over the last two decades. The global economic landscape will continue to change 
in the same direction at an even faster rate in the post-crisis era. The forces that have been 
reshaping the world economy, and which are just gaining momentum, are rapid technological 
change, mainly due to the information technologies, globalisation and convergence 
processes, and changing world demographics. There is an asymmetry in the way, the timing, 
and the magnitude with which both advanced and emerging economies have been affected 
by these forces. This asymmetry has the potential to become even more pronounced in the 
future.  
The productivity gains provided by the rapid technological change, globalisation and 
convergence processes were an important factor in the creation of the era of Great 
Moderation. During that era, countries, one by one, starting with advanced economies, 
achieved a low, stable level of inflation together with rapid growth performance. It was a 
perfect environment for central bankers since they had the best of two worlds – low inflation 
and rapid growth – at the same time. Inflation volatility and output growth significantly shrank 
for more than two decades up to the current crisis. With the help of rapid productivity gains 
and the introduction of many new goods to the world economy, central banks had no 
difficulty in keeping interest rates at historically low levels when global economic activity was 
booming. In turn, low inflation and real interest rates, combined with high economic growth 
over a substantial period of time, created strong upward pressure in global asset prices. One 
of the main implications of the classical growth theory is the so-called convergence process. 
Capital would flow from the richer to the poorer countries where the marginal product is 
higher. Initially, poorer countries, having higher marginal productivity, would grow faster than 
the richer ones until convergence was achieved. However, the instances where this process 
was observed were so rare that the countries actually achieving this were seen as having 
achieved a miracle, as Lucas’ (1993) seminal work “Making a miracle” suggests. This was 
the case until the last two decades – successful examples have now become more common.  
The financial sector has been one of the sectors that has benefited most from the advances 
in computer and information technologies. The rapid innovation of new instruments together 
with the decreasing transaction costs facilitated by these new technologies have significantly 
changed the risk structure of this sector. As a result, on the one hand, idiosyncratic risks are 
better diversified but, on the other hand, excessive systemic risks were accumulated and 
greatly underpriced. 
The recent global economic developments led to a rapid contraction in the world economy 
and financial markets and a deceleration in trade volume. Starting from the last quarter of 
2008 in particular, the developments in the global financial markets had a considerable 
impact on Turkey. The Turkish banking and financial sector has been quite robust: unlike 
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many economies, Turkish financial institutions have not required any capital support. In fact, 
the average capital adequacy ratio in the Turkish banking sector has risen during the crisis, 
currently fluctuating at around 20%, well above the target level of 12% and the legally 
required level of 8%. The profitability of Turkish banks generally increased in 2008 and 2009, 
and a significant increase in profitability is expected for 2010. Turkey is one of the few 
countries whose credit rating has improved significantly during the crisis.  
The net foreign exchange (FX) position of the banking sector (see Figure 1) has been close 
to zero, indicating that Turkish banks carry no significant FX risk. The main factor enhancing 





The financial strength index of the banking sector in Turkey, which is computed from sub-
indices on a monthly basis by the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT), shows that 
the sector has remained relatively strong during the crisis.  
Although the banking and financial sector has remained relatively robust during the crisis, the 
real economy has been significantly affected, mostly through the international trade channel. 
External demand contracted rapidly in the last quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009. 
The annual volume of exports amounted to USD 136 billion as of September 2008 but 
dropped to USD 100 billion as of September 2009. Likewise, the annual volume of imports 
dropped to USD 139 billion from USD 212 billion over the same time frame. In the same 
period, the current account deficit decreased from USD 48 billion to USD 13 billion. Capital 
inflows turned from USD 49 billion into an outflow of USD 4 billion. After peaking in the last 
quarter of 2009, the ratio of non-performing loans (NPLs) has been gradually declining (see 
Figure 2). 
Net FX Position of the Banking Sector 
(Q4 2000–Q1 2010,* in USD billions) 
* As of February 2010 
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Figure 1:  




The following figures show the dramatic growth in the Turkish export sector prior to the crisis. 
Between 2002 and 2008, the average annual growth rate of Turkish imports and exports was 
more than 25%. During the same period, Turkish exports and imports measured in US 
dollars almost tripled. The Turkish economy used to be a more closed economy, but in less 
than one decade, international trade has become an important factor. The change in the 
sectoral composition of exports has been even more dramatic. Figure 4 shows that, before 
2002, textiles, yarn, and food-related sectors dominated Turkish exports, whereas by 2008, 
sectors such as automobiles and parts, electrical machinery and appliances, and industrial 
machinery started to become more important. This reflects the rapid transformation achieved 
by the Turkish production and export sectors in the last decade. The Turkish production 
sector rapidly climbed the technology ladder during that period. However, this outstanding 
success also increased the sensitivity of Turkish exports to business cycles. The sectors that 
have become more dominant are demand-sensitive sectors such as investment and durable 
goods. It is estimated that if overall demand falls by 1%, the demand for textiles and food 
products will fall by around 1–2%, while the demand for durable goods, including 
automobiles, will fall by around by 4–5%. The Turkish export sector has also become more 
specialised over time. For instance, Turkey’s average export bundle is much closer to the 
average domestic consumption bundle in 2002 when compared to the average export bundle 
and domestic consumption bundle in 2008. When external demand for Turkish export 
products shrinks, the specialisation in the export bundle leads to a sectoral shock as 
opposed to an overall demand shock in the economy. Studies have shown that sectoral 
shocks negatively affect resource utilisation in the economy since they require significant 
resource reallocation between sectors. Therefore, following a sectoral shock, capacity 
reallocation and unemployment are disproportionately negatively affected. As a result, the 
unemployment rate in Turkey rapidly increased during the early phase of the global financial 
crisis: it was 10.3 % in September 2008, but increased to 16.1 % in February 2009. The 
unemployment rate began to fall, reaching 12.8% in July 2009, partly due to the effect of the 
tax reductions implemented in certain sectors and partly due to seasonality factors. 
Compared with the same period in the previous year, the unemployment rate had increased 
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Loans to SMEs  
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Sources: BRSA, CBRT 
Figure 2 
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Real import and real export indices 
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Due to the global economic developments, the external borrowing possibilities for banks and 
non-bank entities became more limited. Demand for banking services decreased sharply as 
a result of the contraction in economic activity, and bank intermediation slowed down. This 
paper examines these two effects in detail. In the second section, cross-border lending to 
Turkey before and during the crisis is analysed. In the third section, we look at how the crisis 
led banks operating in the domestic markets to change the key aspects of their business 
models. Section four examines whether the foreign banks operating locally responded 
differently during the crisis. Finally, the fifth and sixth sections explain the impact of the 
financial turmoil on the local money and debt markets and the CBRT’s interventions to deal 
with the crisis. 
2.   Cross-border lending 
Turkey benefited most from the recovery in foreign direct investment and other investments, 
which mainly covers bank-related inflows after 2002. 
Figure 5  
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Foreign direct investments Portfolio investments
Other investments Net capital inflows
 
Sources: BRSA, CBRT. 
 
However, net capital outflows started to occur in late 2008 after the onset of the global crisis 
due to the decline in portfolio investments and other investments. In the second quarter of 
2009, although portfolio inflows started to rise, net capital flows were subdued by other 
investment outflows until the end of the second quarter. The contraction in other investment 
flows that reflected a decline in external debt rollovers both for banks and for corporates 
appeared to be reversing gradually in the third quarter. 
Over the nine-month period to September 2009, net capital inflows were only USD 1.4 billion. 
During that period, foreign direct investment amounted to USD 5.3 billion and net portfolio 
investments totalled USD 0.9 billion. On the other hand, outflows in other investments 
amounted to USD 4.8 billion. 
Over the past five years, the external debt of both financial and non-financial entities has 
risen significantly. The total external debt of private entities to GDP increased by 
9.3  percentage points, reaching 25.3% in 2008. The financial sector’s external debt 
accounted for 8.6% of GDP and that of non-financial entities accounted for 16.7% of GDP. 392  BIS Papers No 54
 
 
As tensions in the financial markets began to increase, international credit to Turkey, as in 
other emerging markets, was trimmed, and the outstanding amount of external liabilities 
started to decline. The total external debt of the private sector dropped to USD 177.0 billion 
in the second quarter of 2009 from USD 185.9 billion in 2008. 
Figure 6 
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Sources: BRSA, CBRT. 
 
Private sector statistics regarding the international investment position and outstanding loans 
received from abroad give detailed information about the type of borrowing instruments as 
well as more timely information regarding the external liabilities of the private sector. 
According to these statistics: 
  Long-term external credit to banks rose to USD 30 billion in 2008 from 
USD 3.1 billion in 2003. However, a USD 2.4 billion fall in long-term external credit 
to banks was registered in the first eight months of 2009 and long-term external 
credit to banks declined to USD 27.6 billion as of August 2009. 
  Short-term external credit to banks reached USD 9.5 billion in 2008 from 
USD  5.3  billion in 2003. It subsequently dropped by USD 3.7 billion, standing at 
USD 5.8 billion as of August 2009. This implies that interbank deposits, which do not 
require collateral and are assumed to be more liquid than loans, replaced short-term 
external credit to banks. 
  Cross-border deposits increased to USD 15.3 billion in 2008 from USD 4.4 billion in 
2003. They continued to increase in 2009 and rose by USD 3.6 billion in eight 
months, reaching USD 18.8 billion as of August 2009. 
  Thus, total external liabilities, including both loans and deposits, which showed a 
USD 42 billion increase over the past five years (33.1% average annual growth), 
dropped by USD 2.5 billion during the first eight months of 2009 (4.8%). 
  Regarding non-financial entities, long-term external credit to non-financial entities 
rose to USD 99.5 billion in 2008 from USD 24.8 billion in 2003. However, a fall of 
USD 3.7 billion in long-term external credit to non-financial entities was registered in 
the first eight months of 2009 and long-term external credit to non-financial entities 
declined to USD 95.8 billion as of August 2009. BIS Papers No 54  393
 
 
Table 1  
External debt of the private sector 
(in billions of US dollars)  2003  2008  2009Q2 
Short-term external debt  18,8  45,4  43,0 
Financial entities  8,4  21,9  21,2 
Banks 8,4  21,6  20,9 
Non-banks 0,0  0,2  0,3 
Non-financial entities  10,5  23,5  21,8 
Long-term external debt  30,1  140,6  133,9 
Private sector  30,1  140,6  133,9 
Financial entities  5,3  41,1  37,4 
Banks 3,1  30,0  27,8 
Non-banks 2,2  11,0  9,6 
Non-financial entities  24,8  99,5  96,5 
Total external debt of the private sector  48,9  185,9  177,0 
Financial entities  13,6  63,0  58,6 
Banks 11,5  51,7  48,7 
Non-banks 2,2  11,3  9,9 
Non-financial entities  35,3  123,0  118,4 
 
  The amount of short-term credit to non-bank entities was small and has not changed 
substantially over the past few years. It stood at USD 1.7 billion as of August 2009, 
USD 1.4 billion of which was related to non-financial entities. 
  Trade credits rose to USD 22.7 billion in 2008 from USD 9.1 billion in 2003 but fell 
by USD 1.5 billion in the first eight months of 2008, decreasing to USD 21.2 billion in 
August 2008. 
  Thus, total external liabilities, which includes both loans and trade credits and which 
showed an increase of USD 88.3 billion over the past five years (28.5% average 
annual growth), fell by USD 5.2 billion during the first eight months of 2009 (4.3%). 
  Long-term external credit to non-bank financial entities rose to USD 9.6 billion in 
2008 from USD 2.2 billion in 2003. However, a fall of USD 2.1 billion in long-term 
external credit to non-bank financial institutions was registered in the first eight 
months of 2009, and long-term external credit to non-bank financial institutions 
declined to USD 8.9 billion as of August 2009. 
  Looking at the creditor side, foreign banks’ long-term credit claims rose to 
USD 77.2 billion in 2008 from USD 16.4 billion in 2003 and fell to USD 72.3 billion in 
August 2009. 
All in all, before the crisis, both financial and non-financial entities raised their outstanding 
amount of external liabilities due to the abundant global liquidity. After the crisis, the 
refinancing of the private sector’s total external liabilities became difficult. The private sector 
started to become a net payer. During that period, banks and non-financial entities were not 
reluctant to add new loans to their balance sheet because of the low investment needs 394  BIS Papers No 54
 
 
related to the contraction in domestic and external demand. Their main concern was only to 
rollover the existing debt. In addition, banks abroad started to become more conservative 
and did not want to take on more risk related to the financial difficulties in their home country. 
As a result, the outstanding amount of the private sector’s external liabilities fell. However, it 
should be underlined that the total decline was not as substantial as expected at the 
beginning of the crisis. 
3.   Banking intermediation 
Banking intermediation grew mainly due to the sustained credit expansion over the previous 
five years, during which double-digit real growth rates were observed in the size of banks’ 
balance sheets. The average real growth rate of banks’ total assets stood at 13.8% between 
2003 and 2008 and the ratio of total assets to GDP grew from 54.9% to 77.1%. During that 
period, the growth rate of loans was more than double that of total assets, and the ratio of 
total loans to GDP rose to 38.7% from 14.6%.  
The asset structure of the banking sector changed in favour of loan portfolios. While the 
share of loans in total assets rose to 50.2% in 2008 from 26.5% in 2003, the share of 
securities declined to 26.5% from 42.8%. Over recent years, the concentration of the banking 
sector’s loan portfolio in segments related to households increased. In addition, while the 
share of foreign currency denominated loans decreased, the maturity of the loan portfolio 
lengthened. In 2003, the share of loans to households was 19.4%, the share of foreign 
currency loans was 45.4% and the share of short-term loans was 55.8% of total outstanding 
loans. At the end of 2008, the corresponding percentages were 32.1%, 28.7% and 42.9%, 
respectively. Household loans were in domestic currency. Turning to the structure of the 
securities portfolio, 97.3% of total securities included national government debt instruments, 
the share of which has not changed significantly over recent years.  
Banks did not rely heavily on market funding in Turkey and continued to fund their balance 
sheets mainly through customer deposits, which were assumed to be more stable in most 
circumstances. In 2003, deposits accounted for around 62.2% of total liabilities, with funding 
from other banks and repo transactions accounting for 14.9%. The corresponding 
percentages were 62.1% and 18.2%, respectively, in 2008. The increase in borrowings from 
banks and repo funding was mainly against the share of capital in total assets. The share of 
capital in total assets dropped to 11.8% in 2008 from 14.9% in 2003. Thus, banks’ leverage 
expanded rapidly from 2003 to 2008, mainly through borrowings from other banks, which 
covered most of their external liabilities. The outstanding amount of external liabilities 
increased to USD 55.4 billion in 2008 from only USD 13.2 billion in 2003, indicating an 
average annual increase of 33.1% in US dollars. During that period, long-term loan 
borrowings from abroad rose to USD 30.6 billion from USD 3.5 billion, indicating an average 
annual increase of 53.9% in US dollars. The share of long-term loan borrowings in total 
external liabilities increased to 63.3% in 2007 from 26.5% in 2003, subsequently declining to 
55.2% in 2008. Thus, although the total outstanding amount of external liabilities did not 
decline in 2008, the structure of the amount started to change in favour of short-term loans 
and deposits. 
The maturity of deposits in banks was very short. The amount of deposits that were due in 
three months constituted 91.2% of total outstanding deposits in 2008. The longer-term loan 
borrowings from abroad contributed to extending the maturity of loans granted during that 
time. The magnitude of loans did not surpass that of deposits in most banks, which 
decreased the funding liquidity risk. However, the loan to deposit ratio rose significantly to 
81.6% in 2008 from 48.2% in 2003.  
Banks’ asset quality improved and has remained strong over the past few years. Non-
performing or doubtful assets, while increasing, tended to drop as a share of total loans BIS Papers No 54  395
 
 
mostly due to the strong growth of the loan portfolios. The share of NPLs in total loans 
decreased to 3.7% in 2008 from 11.5% in 2003. Measures of capital adequacy for the 
banking sector showed an overall decline in recent years. The decline in the overall solvency 
ratio was mainly due to the expansion in lending activities. The solvency ratio decreased to 
18.0% in 2008 from 30.9% in 2003. 
Over the past few years, another important observation was related to the de-dollarisation of 
banks’ balance sheets. The share of foreign currency assets in total assets declined to 
34.0% in 2008 from 44.6% in 2003. Turning to the liability side, the share of foreign currency 
liabilities in total liabilities declined to 34.7% from 44.7%. During that period, when the global 
financial developments began to affect the banking system, banks’ currency risk remained 
very limited. 
As the stress in the financial markets unfolded, the growth of total assets decelerated in 
comparison with previous years. The rate of growth in real terms during the first nine months 
of 2009 was only 6.7%. Two significant developments took place that affected the total 
assets of credit institutions: a drop in the outstanding amount of loans and an increase in the 
financing of government borrowing needs. In the fourth quarter of 2008, banks’ aggregate 
loan portfolio started to decrease. As the intensity of the crisis became evident, banks were 
becoming increasingly risk-averse and tightened their lending conditions. In addition to 
supply constraints, the demand for loans also decreased as a result of weakening external 
and domestic demand and rising unemployment. As a result, loans granted to firms and 
households were curtailed. As of September 2009, loans increased by only 0.1% in real 
terms, compared to the previous year-end. Rising demand for funds from the government 
also lead to the slowdown in bank lending activity. While loans were declining, the growth 
rate of securities investments, which consisted mainly of government debt instruments, rose 
by 21.8% in real terms from December 2008 to September 2009. Consequently, while the 
share of loans in total assets dropped to 47.1% in September 2009 from 50.2% in December 
2008, the share of securities in total assets rose to 30.2% from 26.5%. Regarding the 
distribution of the loan portfolio, the share of loans to households in total loans increased to 
33.1% in August 2009 from 32.1% in the previous year-end. This was due to the fact that 
loan growth remained on a downward path in the case of non-financial corporations, while in 
the case of households, the earlier downward movement in loan growth levelled off in recent 
months. Turning to the maturity and currency structure of the loan portfolio, the share of 
short-term loans in total loans decreased slightly (42.7%) and foreign currency loans 
continued to decline (26.6%). 
During the crisis, borrowings from other banks, which consisted mainly of external liabilities, 
seized up and the growth rate of deposits slowed down, leading to a sharp decline in 
leverage. As of September 2009, the share of deposits in total liabilities decreased slightly to 
61.2% from 62.1% at the end of 2008 and the share of funding from other banks dropped to 
10.7% from 12.7%. The outstanding amount of external liabilities decreased to 
USD 53.0 billion in August 2009 from USD 55.4 billion in 2008 and the share of long-term 
loan borrowings in external liabilities continued to decline and stood at 53.6% as of August 
2009. Total syndication and securitisation loans decreased by USD 3.7 billion in the first nine 
months of 2009, amounting to USD 20.0 billion by the end of September 2009. Banks partly 
offset the decline in borrowings from other banks by increasing the funding from repo 
markets. The share of repo funding in the balance sheet rose slightly to 6.9% in September 
2009. As a result, the capital to asset ratio increased to 13.2% from 11.0%. 
Due to the decline in lending to households and non-financial corporations, the loan to 
deposit ratio, a measure of funding liquidity risk, decreased to 81.2% in September 2009 
from 83.9% in 2008. The average credit quality of borrowers deteriorated as a result of the 
general economic slowdown. As of September 2009, NPLs increased rapidly, with their 
share in the loan portfolio moving up from 3.7% to 5.3%. The deterioration was mainly in the 
segments of loans to households and loans to small- and medium-sized enterprises. 396  BIS Papers No 54
 
 
Regarding the dollarisation of the balance sheet, the share of foreign currency funding and 
foreign currency assets in the balance sheet continued to decline (32.9% and 31.4%).  
As of September 2009, the capital adequacy of banks improved compared with the previous 
year-end. The overall solvency ratio of banks amounted to 20.1%, mainly on account of the 
high profits gained during the first nine months of 2009 and the decrease in risk-weighted 
assets. Over the past five years, the average return on equity (ROE) and return on assets 
(ROA) were 2.1% and 15.8%, respectively. As of September 2009, despite the high 
impairment charges due to the rise in problem loans, the annualised figures for ROE and 
ROA rose to 2.6% and 20.4%, mainly due to the increase in net interest margins and gains 
from trading activities. The decrease in interest rates led to a rise in net interest margins due 
to the maturity mismatch in the balance sheet. The sharp decline in interest rates also 
contributed to the valuation gains for treasury securities.  
All in all, the global crisis also affected the banking sector in Turkey. Demand for banking 
services decreased sharply as a result of the contraction in economic activity. Banks were 
rather conservative in their lending due to the increased risks and the slowdown in loan 
demand as well as the rising demand for funds from the government. Credit risks also 
increased as the ratio of NPLs to total loans rose. Due to the global economic developments, 
the external borrowing possibilities for banks became more limited. However, the global crisis 
affected the Turkish banking sector to a relatively limited extent in comparison with many 
other countries because of its high capital adequacy ratio and low leverage and currency 
risks. Despite the high loan growth rates over the past few years, customer deposits still 
remained the main funding source, and the amount of deposits were higher than the amount 
of outstanding loans. The share of foreign currency loans, which could have caused an 
indirect credit risk during the crisis, was also limited, especially for households. Nevertheless, 
the interest risk was higher due to a maturity mismatch caused by long-term assets against 
short-term liabilities. The rapidly falling interest rates had a positive effect on interest margins 
and profitability. Finally, it should be underlined that there were no bank failures or public 
support programmes for the Turkish banking sector during the crisis. Although some key 
aspects of banking sector operations in Turkey changed, the banking sector remained 
resilient during the crisis. 
Table 2 
Financial situation of banks before and during the crisis 
   Before the crisis  During the crisis 
Loan growth  Increase  Decrease 
Share of loans to households  Increase  Increase 
Share of foreign currency loans  Decrease  Decrease 
Share of short term loans  Decrease  Decrease 
Investment in government debt securities  Decrease  Increase 
Loan to deposit ratio  Increase  Decrease 
Non-performing loan ratio  Decrease  Increase 
Share of customer deposit funding  No change  No change 
Share of external liabilities due to banks  Increase  Decrease 
Leverage Increase  Decrease 
Capital adequacy ratio  Decrease  Increase 
Dollarisation Decrease  Decrease 
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4.   Domestically owned versus foreign-owned banks 
Foreign banks expanded their presence in Turkey quite significantly during the last five 
years. However, the market share of foreign-owned banks in total assets, loans and deposits 
was only 17.0%, 20.2% and 15.5%, respectively, as of September 2009. The proportion of 
foreign banks in the Turkish banking sector was not very large in comparison with many 
other emerging countries.  
The proportion of customer loans in total assets for foreign banks remained above that of 
domestic banks while the share of securities was below. Loans to households accounted for 
a higher share for foreign banks and the share of loans to small- and medium-sized 
enterprises was close to that of private domestic banks. Looking at the liabilities side, 
customer deposits were the most important funding source for foreign banks. Liabilities due 
to banks represented a substantial part of funding sources in comparison with domestic 
banks. However, funds raised from repo markets were not as important for foreign banks. 
Table 3  
Ratio analysis – domestic versus foreign banks 
   2008/12 2009/9 
   Public Private Foreign  Public  Private Foreign
Asset structure (% of total assets)                   
Loans 41,3  52,2  59,6  40,4  47,5  59,1 
Securities 38,2  24,0  13,1  40,6  28,5  15,3 
Liability structure (% of total assets)                   
Deposits 69,9  59,3  56,5  67,2  58,4  58,6 
Due to banks  5,7  14,6  19,1  5,2  12,5  15,8 
Repo 5,0  7,2  1,5  7,7  8,1  1,5 
Currency structure (%)                   
Foreign currency assets to total assets  23,0  37,0  23,0  21,6  32,8  21,6 
Foreign currency loans to total loans  21,5  35,9  18,1  21,6  33,7  15,3 
Foreign currency liabilities to total liabilities  23,6  39,0  42,4  21,8  37,0  38,7 
Foreign currency deposits to total deposits  25,2  40,3  41,6  24,3  41,2  40,3 
Leverage (%)                   
Capital to assets  12,1  11,3  12,9  12,7  13,1  14,6 
Liquidity (%)                   
Loan to deposit ratio  61,4  91,3  110,0  62,8  85,9  108,1 
Asset quality (%)                   
Non-performing loans to total loans 3,7  3,5  4,1  4,3  5,4  6,7 
Loans to households to total loans  29,7  30,9  38,3  30,6  32,0  39,0 
Loans to SMEs to total loans  18,6  25,3  23,2  17,3  23,5  23,8 
Profitability (%)                   
Return on equity  17,6  15,8  11,3  23,1  20,2  16,2 
Return on assets  2,1  1,8  1,5  2,9  2,6  2,3 
Capital adequacy (%)                   
Overall solvency ratio  22,9 16,4  16,9  23,9  18,9  18,5 398  BIS Papers No 54
 
 
With regard to the currency structure of foreign banks’ assets and liabilities, the share of 
foreign currency balance sheet liability items tended to be highest among foreign banks. 
Borrowing in foreign currency was more typical for foreign banks. On the other hand, the 
share of foreign currency assets in total assets and the proportion of foreign currency 
denominated loans as a percentage of total loans were not substantial in foreign banks. The 
loan to customer deposit ratio was higher than 100%, unlike the other banking groups, which 
made them more vulnerable to funding liquidity risks. Looking at the differences in profitability 
performance across banking groups, foreign banks did not outperform domestic banks. For 
foreign banks as a whole, the ratio of NPLs and other doubtful loans as a percentage of total 
loans was high compared to domestic banks. 
As regards banks’ capital structure and solvency measures, for foreign banks as a whole, the 
overall solvency ratio remained close to that of private domestic banks and the leverage was 
lower than for all domestic banks. 
One of the potential concerns related to foreign ownership is that foreign banks may react 
differently from domestic banks to adverse changes in business cycle conditions – either at 
home or in a host country – or in the case of a host country banking crisis. There may be 
various explanations for such destabilising behaviour. Parent banks may reallocate their 
capital across regions or countries on the basis of expected risks and returns. Differences in 
business cycle conditions may cause activities of subsidiaries in low-growth countries to be 
scaled down substantially in favour of other countries. Similarly, deteriorating economic 
conditions in the home country may force parent banks to downsize their operations abroad. 
On the other hand, parent banks may provide financial support for their subsidiaries during 
crisis times in host countries, thereby ensuring a smoothing effect on their subsidiaries’ credit 
supply. 
The potentially destabilising behaviour did not hold for Turkey during the crisis. As of 
September 2009, the real growth rates of loans had declined to 0.3% compared with the 
previous year-end for foreign-owned banks. In the meantime, private domestic banks’ loan 
portfolio amount shrank by 4.6% in real terms. Therefore, both private and foreign-owned 
banks decelerated their loan growth during the crisis, but the deceleration was higher for 
private domestic banks. However, public ownership in Turkey had a stabilising effect on 
credit supply. The real growth rate of public banks’ loan portfolios increased by 10.1% in nine 
months. Looking at the liability side, there was no evidence that foreign banks were more 
successful in refinancing their liabilities to other banks than domestic banks. Foreign banks 
tried to replace borrowings from banks with retail deposits. The leverage and loan to deposit 
ratios decreased for foreign banks as a whole, similarly to private domestic banks. Though 
the credit quality deteriorated across all banking groups, the NPL ratio for foreign banks 
increased more than for domestic banks during the crisis. 
5.   Local money and debt markets 
The floating exchange rate regime, implemented as a precondition for the inflation targeting 
regime since 2001, has made a significant contribution to the stability of the Turkish 
economy. Under the floating exchange rate regime, the exchange rate is neither a target nor 
a policy tool and is determined by the supply and demand conditions in the market. 
Nonetheless, by closely monitoring exchange rate developments, the CBRT can directly 
intervene in the markets in case of speculative transactions leading to unhealthy price 
formation and excess volatility in the FX market due to a decrease in depth. However, the 
CBRT has not directly intervened in the FX market since the selling intervention in June 
2006. The Turkish lira depreciated 27.5% against the euro and 42.8% against the US dollar 
during the period between August 2008 and March 2009. The financial markets started to 
recover in the second quarter of 2009 and the Turkish lira appreciated against the major BIS Papers No 54  399
 
 
foreign currencies. Between March and October 2009, the appreciation was 12.2% against 
the euro and 5.8% against the US dollar.  
Although there is no exchange rate level to be maintained in a floating exchange rate regime, 
holding a strong FX reserve position is very important for emerging economies like Turkey to 
eliminate the unfavourable effects of potential internal and external shocks and to boost 
investors’ confidence in the country. Therefore, the CBRT holds FX buying auctions to build 
up reserves at times when the FX supply increases relative to the FX demand. The CBRT 
has been buying FX via transparent FX buying auctions with preannounced terms and 
conditions. However, with the aim of maintaining liquidity in the system, which was being 
permanently withdrawn from the FX market through the auctions, the FX buying auctions 
were suspended as of October 2008. Meanwhile, as unhealthy price formations were 
witnessed due to a decrease in the depth of the FX market, the CBRT started to inject FX 
liquidity into the market through FX selling auctions as of October 2008. However, after they 
were held on two working days, the FX selling auctions were suspended as a result of the 
easing concerns pertaining to the depth of the market. The CBRT resumed FX selling 
auctions from March to April 2009. In the beginning of August 2009, it was observed that, as 
a result of the positive expectations related to the global economy, the liquidity and risk 
appetite had regained strength, capital flows to Turkey had increased (as in other emerging 
markets), and the FX market had become relatively stable. Having determined that this 
process had contributed to a suitable environment in which the CBRT could build up FX 
reserves, the FX buying auctions were resumed as of August 2009. 
Figure 7  
Exchange rates 
 
Sources: BRSA, CBRT. 
 
Due to negative perceptions about the global financial crisis and its effects on the Turkish 
financial system, the benchmark government bond yield rose to 24.42% in October 2008 
from 16.26% in early 2008 and 18.83% in August 2008. During that time, the CBRT raised 
the policy rate by 125 basis points to 16.75%. Starting from November, the CBRT began 
easing its monetary policy in an attempt to support the Turkish financial market and economy 
in addressing the spillovers from the global financial crisis. The policy rate fell by 1,000 basis 
points and stood at 6.75% as of October 2009. The 1,000 basis point fall was reflected in the 
government bond yields, which dropped to 8.70% in October 2009. Thus, in the early stages 
of the global crisis, interest rates first rose substantially and then started to decline as a result 400  BIS Papers No 54
 
 
of the CBRT’s rate cuts and the low inflation expectations engendered by the weak external 
and domestic demand. Banks increasingly invested in government debt securities in order to 
minimise the risks associated with extending credit to the private sector, leading to the 
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Finally, it should be added that the CBRT started repo auctions after May 2008 due to the 
unbalanced distribution of liquidity in the Turkish financial system. These auctions were 
intended to provide an efficient and stable functioning of the money markets by preventing 
excessive volatility in the short term. The interest rates materialised in the repo markets were 
close to the policy rates. 
6.   Central bank instruments to deal with the crisis 
The authorities and organisations adopted a series of measures to ease the negative effects 
of the global financial crisis on Turkey.  
  The CBRT cut its interest rates and extended the maturity in the FX deposit market 
in order to prevent a possible FX squeeze in the financial market. Accordingly, the 
lending rate was reduced to 5.5% from 7.0% for USD and to 6.5% from 9.0% for 
EUR. The maturity of interbank transactions was extended to three months from one 
month. 
  The CBRT resumed its activities as an intermediary in the FX deposit market until 
the removal of uncertainties in the international markets. 
  The CBRT raised its transaction limits twofold to USD 10.8 billion and extended the 
lending maturity to one month from one week in the FX deposit market. 
  It also adopted a strategy to use FX reserves to primarily support the FX liquidity 
needs of the banking system.  
  The reserve requirement ratio was lowered to 5% from 6% in TRY liabilities, and to 
9% from 11% in FX liabilities. With this measure, the CBRT provided additional 
liquidity of TRY 3.3 billon and USD 2.5 billion to the banking system. BIS Papers No 54  401
 
 
Figure 9  
Open market operations 
 
Sources: BRSA, CBRT. 
  It increased the export rediscount credit limit by USD 500 million to USD 1 billion in 
order to contain the effects of the global crisis on various industry sectors. 
Additionally, the rules and principles applicable to the export rediscount loan limit 
were rearranged in order to facilitate the use of these loans. Therefore, the condition 
setting forth the assignment of the reserves for letters of credit to the CBRT was 
repealed. 
  The Central Bank Regulation on the Liquidity Support Facility governing the 
principles and procedures for the utilisation of credit facilities as stipulated in 
subparagraph (c) of paragraph (I) of Article 40 of the Central Bank Law was 
published. Accordingly, the loans will be available: 
  As advance payments, with one-month maturities for a maximum one-year 
period; 
  At the lending rate set for the intraday transactions carried out at the Interbank 
Money Market; bearing in mind the principle that interest rates applicable to 
credits of this nature are higher than those applicable to normal central bank 
open market transactions; 
  Against collateral accepted in the interbank money market; 
  Being limited to an amount equal to twice the size of the equity capital of the 
applying bank. 
7.   Banking regulation in Turkey 
In this section we will discuss the macroprudential policy framework in Turkey. Following the 
establishment of a separate supervisory and regulatory agency (the Banking Regulation and 
Supervision Agency (BRSA)) for banks in September of 2000, the Law on the Central Bank 
of the Republic of Turkey was amended to state that the CBRT’s main goal is “achieving and 402  BIS Papers No 54
 
 
maintaining price stability”. To facilitate this objective, under the terms of its Law, the CBRT 
has also been assigned with the mandate of taking necessary measures to “safeguard 
financial stability”. Thus, pre-emptively identifying and minimising any major risk that may 
endanger financial stability is one of the CBRT’s main objectives. Additionally, the CBRT’s 
vital function as a lender of last resort and its role in the management and supervision of 
payment systems can also be considered significant reasons to effectively focus on 
macroprudential surveillance. In the same context, with its macro perspective and ability to 
analyse the effects that macroeconomic developments have on the financial sector, the 
CBRT is in a better position to detect imbalances or cycles in the system that might cause 
excessive risk-taking by some market participants and which might eventually lead to a 
system-wide failure. In this respect, in its financial stability report published twice a year, the 
CBRT shares its views and concerns with the public on issues that might adversely affect 
market conditions and endanger financial stability. 
The CBRT and other relevant authorities work in close cooperation on issues related to 
financial stability. In that regard, according to Article 99 of the Banking Law, the Financial 
Sector Commission, which consists of representatives of the BRSA, the Ministry of Finance, 
the Undersecretariat of the Treasury, the CBRT, the Capital Markets Board (CMB), the 
Savings Deposits Insurance Fund (SDIF), the Competition Board, the Undersecretariat of the 
State Planning Organisation, the Istanbul Gold Exchange, the securities stock exchanges, 
the futures and options markets and the associations of institutions under the body of the 
BRSA, ensures the exchange of information, cooperation and coordination among 
institutions, proposes joint policies and expresses views regarding matters that relate to the 
future of the financial sector, with a view to establishing and ensuring confidence and stability 
as well as development in the financial markets. In Turkey, non-monetary measures that are 
prudential in nature consist of discretionary variations of regulatory requirements by the 
authorities. Such variations were not specifically designed to tackle the recent crisis, but they 
were already in place. And we believe that such variations, which are intended to avoid the 
origination of systemic risk and any further deterioration in financial conditions, are significant 
macroprudential instruments. 
The measures in place in the Turkish financial regulatory system include the Regulation on 
Measurement and Evaluation of Capital Adequacy of Banks, published on 1 November 2006, 
which sets the minimum standard capital adequacy ratio at 8% and the minimum Tier 1 
capital ratio at 4% for banks operating in Turkey. Additionally, since November 2006, the 
BRSA requires banks to hold a target ratio of 12%, which is stipulated as a prerequisite to 
opening a new branch. This policy might be considered a variation of a capital buffer by 
recognising that more capital is required in good times if a bank tends to exploit favourable 
market conditions by opening new branches. On the other hand, during periods of 
unfavourable economic conditions, this prerequisite becomes a slack condition since banks 
will have less incentive to open a new branch. 
Another more macro-based approach is to adjust the risk weights assigned to assets in order 
to control credit. To this end, to control the credit supply for credit cards, the risk weights for 
credit card limit commitments were increased from 50% to 100%, which pushed down the 
capital adequacy ratio, thereby encouraging banks to decrease the limits they assigned to 
credit cards. Additionally, in order to curb the risk arising from instalments of credit card 
receivables, the risk weights for receivables with a remaining maturity of six–12 months and 
of more than 12 months, which used to be 100%, were increased to 150% and 200%, 
respectively, leading to an increase in the required capital. Thus, these amendments to the 
risk weights can be considered an indirect limitation on the instalments of credit card 
expenditures. 
According to the Bank Cards and Credit Cards Law, which became effective on 1 March 
2006, the total credit card limit determined for all cards of a customer should not be greater 
than two times his or her average net total monthly income for the first year and four times for 
the second year. The customer should supply the necessary documents, which are BIS Papers No 54  403
 
 
confirmed by related institutions, as evidence of his or her monthly income. Otherwise, the 
total limit for all the customer’s cards is set at TRY 1,000. Such controls on credit card limits 
are intended to curb systemic risk by forestalling households’ exposure to excessive risk. 
The loan to value ratio applicable for mortgage loans is another effective macroprudential 
tool. Based on the Law Amending the Laws Related to the Housing Finance System, dated 
6 March 2007, the loan to value ratio is set at 75% for receivables secured by authorised 
residential property and 50% for receivables secured by other authorised real estate. As an 
additional measure, in 2008 and 2009 the BRSA temporarily made the distribution of banks’ 
profits subject to permission in order to contribute to the strengthening of banks’ capital 
structure. This may also be considered a tool for increasing banks’ resilience to 
vulnerabilities. In fact, 20% of the profit for 2008 was distributed, whereas this rate decreased 
to 15% for 2009, when the Turkish banking sector enjoyed significant profits. 
Loan loss provisioning is another tool to ensure that banks build up buffers against their 
loans. Although the current provisioning system in Turkey is not “dynamic” in nature, by 
changing the required provisioning rates it is possible to control the cyclicality of the loan 
supply. Three liquidity ratios that are used to measure and assess the liquidity adequacy of 
banks can also be considered among the macroprudential instruments implemented by the 
CBRT. These ratios were put into effect in 2007 and, therefore, Turkish banks have been 
operating within the framework of liquidity regulations, which the Basel Committee is 
currently trying to implement at an international level; these ratios had a strong positive effect 
on the resilience of Turkish banks when facing the global financial stress. 
Reserve requirements are a monetary policy instrument that can also be used for 
macroprudential policy purposes. They are used to manage liquidity in the market and 
control credit expansion in order to prevent asset price bubbles. The reserve requirement 
ratio may be increased or decreased if there is a surplus or shortage of funds, or a 
permanent liquidity surplus or shortage in the market. Thus, it is one of the countercyclical 
measures that can be implemented by the central bank. Reserve requirements are used in a 
discretionary way, when necessary, taking account of the liquidity and credit supply 
conditions in the market. As an example, in order to support the upward trend in credit 
growth by way of reducing intermediation costs and injecting permanent liquidity into the 
market, in addition to the measures already implemented by the CBRT, the Turkish lira 
(TRY) required reserve ratio, which stood at 6%, was reduced by 1 percentage point to 5% in 
October 2009. Changes in policy interest rates, even though they are made for monetary 
policy purposes, may also be regarded as macroprudential tools, since they can affect the 
credit channels. 
As a tool to discourage excessive risk-taking, a risk-based deposit insurance premium tariff 
model, which obliges credit institutions to pay risk premia in line with the risks they pose to 
the banking system, was designed by the SDIF and put into effect as of January 2009 by an 
amendment on the Regulation on Deposits and Participation Funds Subject to Insurance and 
Premia to be collected by the SDIF. One of the macroprudential instruments that may be 
used to affect credit expansion and capital inflows into Turkey is the Resource Utilisation 
Support Fund (RUSF), which can be seen as a tax-like charge on loans. RUSF may be used: 
(i) to lessen (or expand) the loan demand by increasing (or decreasing) the cost of loans via 
RUSF rate changes; or (ii) to restrict capital inflows by increasing the RUSF rate on loans 
received from abroad. 
As a measure to limit currency mismatch and ensure that banks maintain their FX positions 
in line with their own funds, according to the Regulation on the Calculation and 
Implementation of the Foreign Currency Net General Position, the absolute value of the 
weekly simple average of the ratio of the foreign currency net general position to the bank’s 
own funds cannot exceed 20%. 
In addition to the Bank Loans Tendency Survey, published every three months, the recently 
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to detect the cyclicality in this sector within the framework of the CBRT’s macroprudential 
surveillance. There is also a Business Tendency Survey (BTS) and Real Sector Confidence 
Index, as well as a Consumer Tendency Survey and Consumer Confidence Index, both of 
which are published every month. The CBRT and BRSA regularly perform macro stress tests 
in order to assess the resilience of the banking sector to several shocks and publish the 
results in their reports as a tool for communicating macroprudential risk assessments. 
Additionally, the CBRT has an extensive risk centre database, which provides feedback to 
banks about their customers’ default history.  
Finally, with a recent amendment dated June 2009 to Decree no 32 on the Protection of the 
Value of Turkish Currency, in order to avoid FX risk, households are prohibited from using 
foreign currency or foreign currency indexed loans. All the above-mentioned instruments are 
intended to avoid failures that might adversely affect the entire financial system. They are 
general and are applied to all institutions with no distinctions between size or systemic 
importance.   
8.   Concluding remarks 
The recent global developments led to a rapid contraction in the world economy and financial 
markets and a deceleration in trade volume. The global crisis affected the Turkish economy 
mainly through four channels, the first of which was the trade channel – exports declined 
substantially. The second was the expectations channel. With the financial turmoil, 
households’ expectations worsened, thereby reducing their consumption. The third was the 
foreign capital flows channel – cross-border lending abated during the crisis period. The last 
one was the credit channel, as banks trimmed their lending during the crisis, the result of 
which was a sharp fall in economic activity and a rise in unemployment. 
As a result of the global financial developments, the external borrowing possibilities for banks 
and non-bank entities became more limited. The outstanding amount of the private sector’s 
external liabilities declined. However, it should be underlined that the total decline was not as 
substantial as expected at the beginning of the crisis. The contraction in other investment 
flows, which reflected a decline in external debt rollovers both for banks and for corporates, 
appeared to be reversing gradually in the third quarter.  
As the intensity of the crisis became evident, banks became increasingly risk-averse and 
tightened their lending conditions. In addition to supply constraints, the demand for loans 
also decreased as a result of weakening external and domestic demand and rising 
unemployment. As a result, loans granted to firms and households were curtailed. Loan 
growth remained on a downward path in the case of non-financial corporations, while in the 
case of households, the earlier downward movement in loan growth has levelled off in recent 
months. 
Banks did not rely heavily on market funding in Turkey and continued to fund their balance 
sheet mainly through customer deposits, which were assumed to be more stable in most 
circumstances. In addition, the share of foreign currency loans, which might have caused an 
indirect credit risk during the crisis, was also limited, especially for households. During the 
crisis, borrowings from other banks, which consisted mainly of external liabilities, seized up 
and the growth rate of deposits slowed down, leading to a sharp decline in leverage. 
The number of foreign banks in the Turkish banking sector was relatively small in 
comparison with many other emerging economies. Loan growth in both private and foreign-
owned banks decelerated during the crisis. However, public ownership in Turkey had a 
stabilising effect on credit supply. Looking at the liability side, there was no evidence that 
foreign banks were more successful in refinancing their liabilities to other banks than 
domestic banks. BIS Papers No 54  405
 
 
Finally, although the recovery in the real economy was gradual, the financial markets started 
to recover in the second quarter of 2009. As of November, the CBRT began easing its 
monetary policy in an attempt to support the Turkish financial market and economy in 
addressing the spillovers from the global financial crisis. The interest rates declined in line 
with the policy rates during this period. The CBRT took various measures to eliminate the 
adverse effects of the problems in the global financial markets on the stability of the domestic 
financial system and to ensure the orderly functioning of the FX and credit markets. 